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Abstract: In his review of the book by Roberto Esposito Due. La macchina della teologia politica 
e il posto del pensiero Ratajczak tries to reconstruct and evaluate Esposito’s attempt to 
reinterpretate the legacy of Western political theology by introducing the concept of the 
“machine of political theology”. He focuses first of all on the use Esposito makes of the 
notion of person in reconstructing the common matrix of both political and economic 
theology. In the end the author proposes to expand Esposito’s reference to the philosophical 
tradition of impersonal thought in order to search in philosophy not only a different 
paradigm of community, but also a different paradigm of the subject of production. 
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In a recently published essay Mario Tronti argues for an actuality of political theology by 
paraphrasing Carl Schmitt’s famous dictum: “All significant conducts of the modern political 
life are secularised religious conducts” (Cacciari, Tronti 2007, 31). Modern democracy, with 
its institutions, rites and relations between leaders and followers, seems for Tronti to be 
nothing else than a religious form of contemporary life. And, at the same time, this passage 
from the secularised concepts of a doctrine of the State to secularised religious rites and 
practices, from theory to praxis, constitutes according to Tronti the very end of the 20th 
century – a century marked by a structural and intimate relationship between political theory 
and political theology, materialized in works by such figures as, among many others, Carl 
Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Franz Rosenzweig, György Lukàcs, Ernst Bloch, Alexandre 
Kojève and Jacob Taubes. The end of the era of political theology means therefore a shift 
from the theology of the State to a theology of the political practice. But one should 
simultaneously also add that this also signifies a shift toward the theology of governmental 
and economical practice.  
Tronti receives support on the part of another major political theologian in Italy, 
Massimo Cacciari, who approaches the discourse of political theology as the effect of an 
eschatological reserve. This he perceives to be an undertaking meant to postpone the 
declared end of time, a deeply anti-messianic discourse (Cacciari, Tronti 2007, 46–47), but the 
only one, according to Cacciari, that can prolong communal life in modern societies. Political 
theology is thus in its very nature katechontic, conceiving of the modern State as the most 
important figure of a secular katechon. But is political theology still just a doctrine of the State? 
Both Tronti and Cacciari, although far from locating the sphere of politics beyond (or before) 
the State, refer to the discourse of political theology not only to revive the philosophy or the 
theory of the State, but to regain the conceptual wealth of political theology. From the early 
ages of Christianity to the dawn of the modern age to the post-war reflection on the 
legitimacy of modern political notions, political theology was able to juxtapose the individual, 
existential experience of time (which is never linear) and its messianic impulses with the 
question of power that is always divided (between Rome and Jerusalem, Empire and the 
Church, potestas and auctoritas etc.). In his treatise on the political theology of katechon Cacciari 
defines the main problems of (Christian) political theology as follows: 
 
The values that are to assume the category of the decision – the idea of novitas against every 
conservatory strength, the breaking of the link, “ontological” in ancient Rome, between potestas 
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and acutoritas – are the cardinal elements of the Christian theological symbol, determined for the 
political dimension of the Eternal, which opens with that symbol (Cacciari 2013, 16). 
 
The idea of novitas and the end of the “ontological” link between potestas and auctoritas 
are precisely the necessary preconditions for the emergence of a strong subjective experience 
of time that leads to a political decision against the existing order and for the future 
community, not (yet) of this world (Cacciari 2013, 15). Political theology is born together 
with this fundamental scission between the past and the future, the subjective and the 
objective, the worldly and the other-worldly, civitas terrana and civitas Dei. In effect, as a 
discourse articulating the elements that emerged in result of this fundamental division, 
political theology is not only a secularised theology of God’s power (in relation to the world, 
the congregation, the chosen people etc.), but a theoretical dispositive articulating politics and 
life, a sort of metaphysics of community. 
 Thus the decision to assume a political-theological perspective is a fundamental one, 
since it is tantamount to interweaving the discourse of political philosophy with that of 
metaphysics (which, in its Christian theo-ontological version, was born roughly in the same 
time as the Trinitarian dogma). And no less fundamental is the decision whether to 
strengthen the katechontic principle of political theology in order to search for a new 
possible, modern articulation of potestas and auctoritas, or to perform a critique of the political-
theological dispositive and go beyond the oppositions operating within. Whichever choice 
one makes, it is a fundamental metaphysical decision that determines the general horizon of 
thinking about the political and politics (this might be a different interpretation of what 
Schmitt referred to when he was writing about a “metaphysical image that a definite epoch 
forges of the world”, Schmitt 1985, 46).  
A recently published book by another Italian philosopher, Roberto Esposito, is one of 
the most radical attempts to assume the political-theological perspective only in order to 
finally situate a possible political philosophy beyond its bounds. Due. La macchina della teologia 
politica e il posto del pensiero [Two. The Machine of Political Theology and the Place of Thought1] is at the 
same time a logical continuation of Esposito’s earlier work and an innovative breakthrough, 
which provides a new perspective both on his thought on community and on political 
theology itself.Here Esposito focuses on the function and genealogy of the notion of 
                                               
1 While writing this review I was using the Italian original version. In the meantime the English translation was 
published, see Esposito 2015. 
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“person”. Person is a dispositve that reveals political theology as a direct opposition to 
community. Whereas any form of subjectivity arises within the dialectic between communitas 
and immunitas as an immunitary reaction to the communal munus, political theology imposes a 
transcendent idea of a “person” on the communal production of subjectivity, just as it 
imposes a sovereign form of power on social relations.  
 Esposito’s focus on the notion of the person allows him to do two things, both 
being innovative theoretical gestures in analysing the discourse of political theology. First of 
all, the notion of person joins the lexicon of Roman law with the language of theology 
(Esposito 2013, 91–102). Persona as the invention of Trinitarian theology appears for the first 
time in Tertullian’s Adversus Praxeam. It came to be an indispensable conceptual tool to 
explicate an ontological relation alien to the ancient world, that between the three “persons” 
of the Trinity and the divine substance. As the source of the first theological heresies of 
Christianity which either gave substantial meaning to the persons and risked being deemed 
polytheistic or, on the contrary, saw person only as a modality of divine being, refusing to 
accept the theological innovation of Trinitarian oikonomia and perceiving God as an undivided 
unity (labelled by the orthodoxy as “Monarchianism”). The concept of person served to 
articulate the ontological plane with the economic one, that is the unity of God’s being with 
the internal division between the “persons”. The economic plane, the plane of the Trinitarian 
oikonomia, refers to God’s action and praxis, to the relation of God’s being to the created 
world and its history. It is no surprise then that the notion of person reappears in 
Christological discourse as a theological explication of the incarnated being of the second 
person of the Trinity. Instead of una substantia, tres personae that characterised the Trinity, 
Christ’s dual, both divine and historical being, is explicated as una persona, duae substantiae 
(Esposito 2013, 96). In any case, the theological function of the person is to articulate both 
the unity and the division. 
 The brunt of Esposito’s genealogy and critique of political theology consists of 
showing the same logic articulating the unity and division present in the secular tradition of 
the person as a juridical notion, one stemming from Roman law. He focuses on the 
institution of slavery in ancient Rome, essential to understand the status of the free person 
which was sui iuris only in a negative relation with the slave who was alieni iuris. The 
dispositive of the person functions within the system of law in order to refer these two 
fundamental social statuses to each other. In this sense the division introduced by the notion 
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of the free person, “is not what definitely separates diverse classes, but what articulates them 
in an unity constituted by the two asymmetrical parts, one subjugated under another, tending 
in this way to coincide with the whole” (Esposito 2013, 99). What interests Esposito is the 
historical and conceptual junction of the theological and juridical notion of the person. 
Whereas the theology of Trinity and Incarnation developed a nexus of unity and separation 
(between substantia and persona), Roman law elaborated on the division between the individual 
and his or her social status as a person. The effect of this junction, as analysed by Esposito, 
was the ongoing division within the human being between the instance of reason or soul (that 
gives the human being the metaphysical, social and political status) and the animal substance, 
what Esposito perceives as the retroactive influence of juridical categories on philosophical 
reasoning (Esposito 2013, 112).   
 The second theoretical outcome of Esposito’s focus in his genealogical 
investigations of political theology on the dispositive of the person lies in his new positioning 
of the very problem of economic theology. Since the publication of The Kingdom and the Glory, 
where Agamben famously declared the theology of the Trinity to be a theological paradigm 
of governmentality (Agamben 2011, xi), the problem of economic theology has been more 
and more widely picked up by various scholars, including many contemporary Italian 
philosophers (Cacciari’s work on katechon might also be considered an example of such an 
investigation). Esposito’s contribution to this debate and his proposition to remodel the use 
that is being made of economic theology lies precisely in showing the economic significance 
of the dispositive of the person, theological in its roots. The reference to the ancient 
institution of nexum, through which debtors placed their bodies and their lives in the hands of 
the creditors, can be treated as Esposito’s attempt to supplement the famous figure of homo 
sacer as the biopolitical grounding of sovereign power with a notion that shows economic 
biopower exercised on the living body itself. By placing his own body in the hands of the 
creditor, the debtor ascribed to this body an economic value. Therefore, while in public law 
he remained a person, in private law he became a thing, a property of the creditor. The literal 
economic value given to the body in the institution of the nexum is verified by historical 
accounts of the vengeance of creditors who could not only sell the insolvent debtor as a 
slave, but even tear his body into pieces if he was in debt to more than one person (Esposito 
2013, 151). In the case of the nexum Esposito is able to show the complicated logic of the 
juridical dispositive of the person in Roman law, which operated on the division between 
Praktyka Teoretyczna 3(17)/2015 
 
210 
public and private, freemen and slaves, persons and things, but only to the extent that the 
introduction of one element of the binary relation meant excluding the second element of the 
relation and its simultaneous subordination to the first one – what also denoted the 
possibility of moving individuals from one sphere (e.g. “persons”) to the other (e.g. “things”).  
 Esposito’s closing remarks, in the last passage of the book, on the debt relation in 
contemporary societies should only be treated as the initial outline of an economic-
theological investigations based on the concept of the person. Nevertheless, the significance 
of Esposito’s perspective is clear. In order to show the internal matrix of both political and 
economic theology, one can refer to the person as both the subject of the decision and as the 
status one is given through the debt relation. The creditor–debtor relation is truly a 
metaphysical relation that endures the changes of the subject, its health and mental capacities, 
its desires and social situation, giving him or her a permanent status. For example, Esposito 
notes that the number one reason for personal bankruptcies in the USA are loans necessary 
for medical care. Further, also in the USA, it is almost impossible to discharge student debt. 
To give an example from Europe, the number of mortgage credits in Poland is close to 2 
million with far more than half of them taken out for at least 20 (in some cases even 30) 
years. These facts clearly show that this metaphysical debt relation still has a biopolitical 
character since we fall into debt to provide the necessary conditions for our lives.  
 Esposito’s answer to this crisis – both in the sense of the persisting economic crisis 
that started as a subprime mortgage crisis and the general crisis of the modern State-form that 
has turned from the welfare State into the debtfare State (Soederberg 2014) – is unfortunately 
bleakly formulated, although it bears a strong philosophical potential. In the situation of a 
generalization of the debt relation, Esposito proposes to push this generalization to its limit 
and acknowledge the communal munus precisely as a principle of the community of debt, 
understood as obligation and duty towards others (Esposito 2013, 228). This philosophical 
postulate of going beyond an economic-theological notion of debt towards an ontological 
concept of debt constitutes the most direct reference to his earlier works on the problems of 
community and immunity. Debt as an ontological relation might be therefore one possible 
formulation of community beyond the modern immunization paradigm (Esposito 2008, 51).  
 Due can end with such a general philosophical project of community based on 
mutual, ontological debt since it presents a concept of political theology that goes far beyond 
a theory of the State, a secularized version of God’s sovereign power, and even beyond a 
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theory of contemporary religious forms of political life. Just like Tronti, Esposito initially 
poses a question: What is the reason for the contemporary actuality of political theology? He 
answers this question by revoking Heidegger and his concept of Gestell, translated into 
English as “positionality” (Heidegger 2012). It is because of our belonging to the paradigm of 
political theology, which still regulates our understanding of politics and ethics that we have 
failed to gain enough distance from it and leave it behind us – just as according to Heidegger 
Gestell regulates our understanding of being. Referring Heidegger’s Gestell to Foucault and 
Deleuze’s notion of dispositive Esposito (2013, 18–19) recalls similar operations performed 
recently by Giorgio Agamben, but it is not Esposito’s use of the notion of Gestell or 
“dispositif" that constitutes his most important contribution in Due. Far more important is 
his reference to Heideggers notion of “machination” (Machenschaft) as a proper paradigm to 
understand the functioning of political theology that makes Due an important work on the 
genealogy of political theology.  
 Esposito reconstructs Heidegger’s “machination” in a manner that allows him to 
equate the logic of this process with his earlier philosophical reconstruction of the 
immunization process as the exclusionary inclusion (Esposito 2002, 10). Political theology is 
thus a “machine” (similar in its internal structure and function to Agamben’s anthropological, 
sovereign or governmental machine), that proceeds by imposing the initial division and then 
reuniting the divided elements in unity on the basis of the subordination of one element to 
the other. Esposito reworks this mechanism on the basis of the notion of person. His 
reconstruction of the 20th century discussions in the field of political theology – from 
Kantorowicz and Schmitt to Peterson, Bataille, Taubes and Assman – focuses therefore on 
the role that the dispositive of the person played in these discourses. Although this 
reconstruction does not provide us with new historical material and, as Adam Kotsko points 
out (Kotsko 2016), is limited to the canon of western thought, it does serve to cast a light on 
the internal coherence of 20th century political theology.  
 But this reconstruction, centred on the dispositive of the person, also allows 
Esposito to read modern philosophical notions of the person – including the contemporary 
utilitarian standpoints of Peter Singer and Hugo Tristram Engelhardt (Esposito 2013, 141–
148) – as belonging to the same political-theological key. Just as long the social relations of 
power are based on the logic of ascribing a status to individual living beings in a manner that 
necessarilly excludes other individuals as not deserving the status of the person, we remain, 
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according to Esposito, on the theological-political grounds. This deeply philosophical 
genealogy and critique of political theology is at the same time practical and all-too-
encompassing, thus risking the objection that Esposito’s interest lies not so much in political 
theology but in philosophy. But this is probably precisely the case: Esposito needs political 
theology as a field of genealogical investigation into the notion of person, but it is not a field 
on which he wishes to remain. 
 The third part of the book confirms this assumption as it is devoted entirely to the 
alternative philosophical tradition – from Averroes to Bruno, from Spinoza, Schelling and 
Bergson to Deleuze – which is characterized by a non-personal concept of thinking. 
Surprisingly enough, Esposito sees in philosophy a paradigm that can present an alternative 
to the machine of political theology since it is in philosophy, at least in some of its strains, 
that person vanishes in the process of impersonal or transpersonal thought. While theology is 
interested mostly, as Agamben shows, in the problem of the subject of action and its 
effectiveness (Agamben 2013), law focuses on the problems of property and appropriation 
(Esposito 2002, 25–61). Philosophy, on the other hand, is first of all an image, theory or 
performance of thought and therefore seems privileged to go beyond the paradigm centred 
on the dispositive of the person. This part of Due presents investigations that build what 
probably constitutes Esposito’s most intriguing philosophical project, namely the philosophy 
of the impersonal (Esposito 2007). But introducing in Due questions of economic theology 
and of the crisis of contemporary economy allows us to draw even further going conclusions. 
Philosophy, and especially philosophy based on the notion of impersonal thought, can be 
perceived as a model for intellectual production in general, the productivity of “general 
intellect”, which is never reducible to the productivity of a single individual. Although 
philosophy has always been a product of single individuals, it was philosophy’s ability to self-
understand, as Esposito shows, that could potentially enable it to see itself as the effect of 
transindividual relations – of a passive, general intellect, a divine intellect that joins individual 
entities and the totality of the world, the impersonality of the mind, etc. It may be the case 
that the philosophical tradition which sees thought as the effect of a separate, impersonal 
intellect can provide a general conceptual framework to grasp the production relations in 
contemporary cognitive capitalism. Esposito does not elaborate on that concept, but his idea 
of a community based on the communal munus must not only do away with the dispositive of 
the person as the basis for the debt relations in the contemporary world, but also come up 
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with a new notion of the subjectivity of communal, creative and cognitive production. Why 
not look for this notion in philosophy? 
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ABSTRAKT: W swojej recenzji książki Roberta Esposito Due. La macchina della teologia politica 
e il posto del pensiero Ratajczak stara się zrekonstruować i poddać ewaluacji podjętą przez 
Esposito probe reinterpretacji dziedzictwa zachodniej teologii politycznej przez 
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produkcji. 
SŁOWA KLUCZOWE: teologia polityczna, teologia ekonomiczna, dyspozytyw osoby, 
filozofia, Roberto Esposito 
 
